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Introduction 
 
 
Trump’s Trade Policy: 
First International Consequences 
Evita Schmieg 
Donald Trump’s election campaign and first hundred days in office were marked by 
abrasive rhetoric on trade, in particular blaming free trade agreements for causing eco-
nomic suffering and unemployment in America. Countries that run large export sur-
pluses with the United States, like Mexico, Germany and China, have drawn the greatest 
ire. Internationally this has provoked fears of trade wars and the end of the multilateral 
world trade order. Latin American countries, for whom the United States is a crucial 
trade partner, are especially concerned. So far, only some of the fears have realised. At 
the same time, efforts are under way across the world to reduce trade dependency on 
the United States. 
 
In March 2017 US President Donald Trump 
published his 2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 
2016 Annual Report. A number of conclusions 
can be drawn for international politics. 
Priorities of US Trade Policy 
One central maxim of the Agenda is that 
national sovereignty is more important 
than trade policy, and US citizens should 
not be directly subject to decisions of the 
World Trade Organisation. In fact this has 
never been the case: WTO rulings can only 
be enforced through national legislation. 
But the hard edge to the wording under-
lines the fundamental prioritisation of 
national sovereignty over multilateral rule-
books. Indeed, aggressive bilateral trade 
policy represents a promising strategy for 
a country as important as the United States, 
which can assert its short-term economic 
interests more easily by that route than in 
multilateral contexts. But even the United 
States needs the protection of WTO mem-
bership to ensure that trade partners main-
tain stable and dependable tariffs. With 
that context in mind, there is hope that 
Washington’s bark will be worse than its 
bite in the multilateral framework. That 
hope is nourished by the Administration’s 
2016 Annual Report, which was presented 
to Congress and adopted together with the 
trade strategy: In almost all the WTO nego-
tiating areas mentioned in the report, the 
Administration says it intends to partici-
pate constructively in ongoing talks in 
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Geneva in 2017. Aggressive rhetoric is largely 
confined to the issue of trade enforcement 
activities. 
The priorities of Trump’s trade agenda 
continue to include strict application of US 
trade legislation. Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 continues to permit the Presi-
dent to authorise “appropriate action” in-
cluding retaliation, where US trade inter-
ests are infringed. And the President can 
apply this instrument relatively easily. 
According to the Trade Policy Agenda, the 
United States is not prepared to tolerate 
unfair trade practices, and has therefore for 
example imposed punitive tariffs against 
certain German steel exporters accused of 
price-dumping. Anti-dumping measures are 
permitted under WTO rules, but only if set 
procedural rules are observed. 
The new Administration’s Trade Policy 
Agenda also makes no bones about its 
intention to use all means available to open 
up markets to American businesses. Trump 
accuses America’s trade partners of oper-
ating opaquely and violating market prin-
ciples, and concludes that “it is time for a 
more aggressive approach”. He also intends 
to take action against the large trade sur-
pluses run by China, Germany and Mexico, 
by revising trade agreements or imposing 
punitive measures. 
Other countries also criticise China and 
Germany for their large trade surpluses, 
which can cause external debt to expand 
on the other side and distort global compe-
tition. Bilateral responses, however, are 
neither economically rational nor permis-
sible under WTO rules. 
The guiding principles of the Trade Policy 
Agenda also include Trump’s de-mand for 
new and better agreements (“deals”). The 
President is determined to assert US inter-
ests in bilateral agreements with its biggest 
trading partners. At one point he suggested 
bilateral talks with Germany (as are planned 
with the United Kingdom after Brexit). After 
it was pointed out that in the EU’s trade 
policy is a matter for Brussels alone – abso-
lutely excluding separate talks with Berlin 
– the idea of a transatlantic free trade area 
reappeared. It would need a new name, 
though, as “TTIP” has become a political 
liability on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Concerned Latin America 
So what does the US Trade Policy Agenda 
actually mean for its trading partners? 
Countries that are less politically and eco-
nomically important to the United States 
can expect to be less affected. In the Carib-
bean these include Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, as 
well as the Dominican Republic, whose free 
trade agreement is viewed positively in 
Washington because here the export sur-
plus is on the US side. Yet other US policies 
such as clamping down illegal migration 
could hit these countries hard, where 
remittances from migrants working in the 
United States often play an important role. 
Mexico comes in for heavy criticism, both 
for its trade surplus and as a source of ille-
gal migration. As an immediate neighbour, 
Mexico is heavily economically dependent 
on the United States, with bilateral trade 
amounting to about half its GDP figure. 
In addition, the 35 million US residents 
of Mexican extraction transfer $25 billion 
home each year. Trump’s campaign threats 
initially caused the Mexican peso to fall 
significantly against the US dollar. Most 
prominently, Trump proposed building 
a wall on the Mexican border and funding 
it with a 20 percent levy on imported Mexi-
can goods. He also said he would withdraw 
from NAFTA and in a couple of instances per-
suaded manufacturers not to move produc-
tion abroad. Ironically, a falling exchange 
rate contradicts Trump’s own intentions by 
making Mexican imports even more com-
petitive, US exports to Mexico more expen-
sive and deepening the US current account 
deficit. This certainly cannot be in the US 
interest. 
However, taxes and duties on Mexican 
goods would also harm the US economy. 
Tightly integrated value chains connect in-
dustries on both sides, with Mexican firms 
for example supplying components to the 
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US car industry. This might explain why 
Trump’s wild promises have not as yet been 
followed by action. Today the United States 
goes no further than saying it intends to 
renegotiate NAFTA. There would in fact be 
good reason to modernise the agreement, 
which dates from 1994. Canada and Mexico 
have both indicated their openness and are 
coordinating closely. But renegotiation 
means constructive talks rather than de-
structive punitive tariffs. 
Cuba has also found itself at the re-
ceiving end of Trump’s verbal outbursts. 
During the campaign he said he would 
close the recently reopened US embassy 
in Havana unless the government met his 
demands for the release of political pris-
oners and religious and political freedom 
for the Cuban people. It would be very easy 
to reverse Obama’s moves to open up rela-
tions, most of which were based on execu-
tive orders that can be reversed at the 
stroke of a pen, rather than legislative acts. 
But US businesses and citizens benefit from 
the changes too: Texan farmers in particu-
lar export to Cuba, US airlines fly to Cuban 
destinations, AirBnB lists four thousand 
rentals on the island, and Cuban exiles 
have invested via their families in the small 
but growing private tourism sector. These 
developments have brought about a change 
in US public opinion towards Cuba. Today 
75 percent of adult Americans support the 
reinstatement of diplomatic relations and 
two-thirds of Cuban exiles in Miami want 
the economic embargo lifted. 
Growing Interest in Trade Coopera-
tion without the United States 
The risks presented by Trump’s trade poli-
cies are leading other countries to seek more 
reliable partners. One notable instance is 
the developments following Washington’s 
decision not to sign the already negotiated 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the 
Asian and Latin American countries around 
the Pacific. The countries of the Pacific 
Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) 
are relatively liberal on trade in Latin Ameri-
can terms and strongly engaged in trade 
with Asia; as such they are especially 
affected by the TPP debacle. In March 2017 
they therefore invited the other TPP states 
(but not the United States) plus China, 
Colombia and South Korea to a conference, 
where the participants agreed to seek a 
comprehensive trade agreement. While the 
negotiations will take years and it remains 
uncertain what shape the outcome will 
take, the meeting itself is a visible sign 
of accelerating reorientation. The Pacific 
Alliance accounts for about one-third of 
Latin America’s GNP and more than half of 
its world trade. Now it hopes to provide a 
platform for future free trade agreements. 
Trump’s trade policy is also spurring 
growing movement in the South American 
common market, Mercosur, which unites 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(Venezuela’s membership is presently sus-
pended). The presidents of Argentina and 
Brazil, Mauricio Macri and Michel Temer, 
have agreed to inject a “historical dyna-
mism” into Mercosur and even Chile in in-
terested in partnership. However, the latest 
political developments in Brazil put the 
dampers on hopes for rapid change. Until 
that juncture this trade group had anyway 
been in a rather lamentable state for years. 
Additionally, talks between Mercosur and 
the Pacific Alliance about closer cooperation 
up to and including the possibility of estab-
lishing a free trade area began in April 2017. 
Trump’s Trade Agenda 
Changes Geopolitics 
As the strongest economic power, the 
United States would have been able to use 
TPP and TTIP to expand and consolidate 
its dominant position as a trade and invest-
ment hub. This prospect would have raised 
grounds for concern in Europe, and further 
heightened interest in a European agree-
ment with Asia. Now Trump’s inward turn 
has once again transformed the interna-
tional trade environment. After the failure 
of TPP, Latin American countries have 
taken the initiative themselves to enhance 
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their integration with Asia. China, after 
being marginalised in the TTIP/TPP context, 
has received a new chance to offer itself as 
a reliable economic partner. Beijing demon-
strated its intention to grasp this oppor-
tunity at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos this January, where it advocated 
against protectionist tendencies and for a 
multilateral trade system. China has also 
concretised its interest in this new role 
with visits by high-ranking representatives 
to Latin America (and elsewhere) and not 
least in its decision to seek free trade agree-
ments in the Latin America/Pacific region. 
China has set itself the target of expanding 
trade with Latin American to $500 billion 
yearly by 2025 and expanding its direct 
investment there to $250 billion in sum. 
But Trump’s inward turn also makes 
Europe more attractive to other partners, 
after a decade of financial and economic 
crisis. This could for example give an addi-
tional boost to the negotiations for a free 
trade agreement with Mercosur (without 
Venezuela). These started long ago, but 
were suspended from 2012 to 2016. The ob-
jective is a comprehensive agreement not 
only to reduce tariffs, but also to address 
issues such as technical barriers to trade, 
services and public procurement. 
Relations between the European Union 
and Cuba were already set to intensify 
through the cooperation agreement of 
2016. On account of Cuba’s geographical, 
historical and political situation (first and 
foremost the US embargo), Europe is an 
important trade partner. Europe should 
throw its political weight behind dialogue 
to strengthen European values and prin-
ciples such as democracy, human rights 
and (also economic) participation. 
If President Trump’s abrasive trade policy 
ends up persuading the rest of the world 
to cooperate better with one another, the 
threat of trade wars and punitive tariffs 
might actually do some good too, at least in 
the long term. The EU now has a chance to 
consolidate its economic and political posi-
tion through closer cooperation with Latin 
American and also Asian states. Hopefully it 
will grasp this opportunity. Donald Trump’s 
presidency – together with the UK’s Brexit 
decision – is certainly (and gratifyingly) 
reviving public appreciation of the Euro-
pean project. 
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